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DEFENSE COUNSEL AS ADVOCATE
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM
Barry Ivan Slotnick*
I did not go to law school to be a press agent for criminals, not
even for alleged criminals. My job is to defend zealously the ac-
cused in court, to vindicate those rights and liberties affected by
the criminal process, and, if possible, to secure a positive result for
my client, such as an acquittal. Why should I also shoulder the
additional responsibilities of being a spokesperson for my client?
The answer is that if I am to do a good job as a criminal defense
lawyer, I must on occasion be something of a public relations agent
as well.
I frequently proclaim my client's innocence from the court-
house steps, or from any other location where there is likely to be
a TV camera or a pocket notebook. I do so without the slightest
apology. In the absence of gag orders and gag rules, I would do it
more often. I have four reasons for this:
(1) To counteract the effect on the jury pool and the
judge of the prosecution's public proclamations of my cli-
ent's guilt;
(2) To counteract the effect in my client's community of
the prosecution's public proclamations of my client's
guilt;
(3) To vindicate my client's First Amendment right to
free speech;
(4) To exercise my own First Amendment right to free
speech.
* Barry Slotnick, Esq., was the lawyer who represented Bernhard Goetz in his
criminal case in which Goetz was acquitted of all serious charges except for one mi-
nor gun possession charge. Mr. Slotnick has been named the best criminal lawyer in
the country by the national publication, American Lawyer. He has also received the
Outstanding Criminal Practitioner Award by the New York State Bar Association.
He presently represents many among the rich and famous, including Anthony Quinn
in his present matrimonial matter. The New York Law Journal recently reported
that he wins 95% of the cases he takes to trial.
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I. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
Perhaps in an ideal world, the first two reasons would disap-
pear. I suppose that in an ideal world, the police and the prosecu-
tion would take very seriously the presumption of innocence.
There would be no post-arrest or post-indictment press confer-
ences given by district attorneys, United States attorneys, police,
or FBI agents congratulating themselves for just having scored a
decisive blow against the criminal menace du jour. In an ideal
world businesspeople would not be led out of their offices in hand-
cuffs. In an ideal world the police and the prosecution would co-
operate with defendants to ensure that no one knew that these
presumptively innocent people stood accused of committing
crimes by the august authority of the state.
We do not live in such a world. Prosecutors have become ex-
perts at exploiting the media whenever they have a case that is, or
can be made to seem, the least bit newsworthy.
The first and most familiar problem created by the prosecu-
tion's use of media is the tainting of the jury pool. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed."' That the impartiality of jurors has been com-
promised by the reporting of prosecution claims is sometimes hard
to demonstrate. But it happens. It happens all the time.
Take, for example, an incident during the Bernhard Goetz
trial. Two years had passed between the subway confrontation
and the commencement of the criminal trial. During voir dire, I
asked a juror whether she had any knowledge of this highly publi-
cized case. She responded, "No." Finding this a little difficult to
believe, I proceeded to ask her whether she thought my client
should be convicted. Her answer: "Mr. Goetz should be convicted
because he shot four kids in the back."
When there is publicity by the prosecution, it is the duty of the
defense lawyer to try to level the playing field by countering that
publicity. Rarely will this be completely successful. The prosecu-
tors, after all, are-at least in theory-neutral public servants de-
voted only to justice and the public good. Defense lawyers enjoy a
somewhat less lofty position in the public perception. They cannot
expect the defense sound bites on the courthouse steps to have the
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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same effect as the prosecution's press conference. Yet, we have to
do our best or admit that we do not take seriously the Sixth
Amendment right to an "impartial jury."
It is frequently suggested that pro-defendant speech is unnec-
essary because there are other remedies for excess anti-defendant
speech. We can ask for a change of venue; we can voir dire the
jury and have prejudiced jurors struck for cause; we can have the
judge instruct the jury to ignore anything they have learned from
the media. Unfortunately, these protections for the defendant are,
individually and jointly, utterly insufficient.
There are two problems with venue as a cure for too much
anti-defendant media attention. First, in some cases, the country
simply is not big enough for any venue to have escaped prejudicial
publicity. Technology has expanded the effective community far
beyond the reaches of the old paper carrier on a bicycle. Where
can Ted Kaczynski 2 find an untainted jury pool?
More importantly, the threshold for granting a change of
venue is far too high to protect defendants, except in the cases of
the most extraordinarily tainted jury pools. A high level of public-
ity alone is not enough to require a change of venue under the
law. A change of venue is not to be granted pursuant to Federal
Rule 21(a) unless "there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial
news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial.",4 In the infamous case
of Sheppard v. Maxwell,5 the wife of the accused was bludgeoned
to death. The publicity surrounding the case caused a furor, and a
newspaper headline initiated the coroner's inquest. Yet, this pub-
licity was not enough for a change of venue at the trial court level .
Voir dire of the jury, strikes for cause, and peremptory strikes
do provide some protection for the defendant against tainted ju-
rors, but not enough. Even at their best, voir dire and jury chal-
lenges go only so far. I am not entitled to a strike for cause just
because a juror has heard a great deal about the crime-and al-
most all of it harmful to my client's interests. "[T]he Constitution
2. Theodore Kaczynski is suspected of being the Unabonber, believed to be
responsible for a series of bombings that occurred across the United States beginning
in 1978. Mark Gladstone, U.S. Indicts Kaczynski Over Fatal Unabomber Attack in
New Jersey, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1996, at A17.
3. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,303 (1977).
4. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
5. 384 U.S. 333.
6. Id. at 339, 342-49.
7. State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340,343 (Ohio 1956).
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does not require ignorant jurors, only impartial ones."8 The prob-
lem is that jurors with an agenda may say they are impartial when
they are anything but impartial. Perhaps more frequently, jurors
may think they can be impartial, even when prejudice has infected
them in ways too deep and too subtle for them to recognize.
The final remarks I have about leveling the playing field con-
cern judges. It is officially presumed-and for most purposes,
properly presumed-that judges are above being influenced by the
media. Nevertheless, every practitioner knows that this view of
judges is, to some extent, a fiction. Judges are human. They are
influenced in the ways that other people are influenced. Judges
may be better at guarding against such influence than are most of
us. They may take great pains to avoid the effects of such influ-
ence on their official acts. Nevertheless, the human psyche is far
too complex for even the best and the wisest to entirely control all
of the subtle effects of information that finds its way into our
memories. Perhaps I am mistaken, but I believe that particularly
strident press broadsides against my clients have had an effect on
judicial behavior. Properly placed corrective accounts by defense
counsel can sometimes turn such pro-prosecution stridency into a
reasonably balanced story. Such action cannot hurt potential ju-
rors or judges.
II. DEFENDING THE CLIENT'S NAME IN THE COMMUNITY
My client has just been arrested and a prosecutor's news re-
lease has painted the accused individual as the scheming perpetra-
tor of a serious crime. My investigation shows that the prosecu-
tion's case is, to put it generously, tissue thin. Should I keep silent
while my client's reputation in the community, perhaps built up
over many years, is destroyed? Should I stand aloof while know-
ing that my client's spouse is shunned by neighbors, and my cli-
ent's children are taunted by schoolmates? Is it sufficient that a
year from now the accused will be acquitted by a jury, or that in
two months, my client's indictment will be dismissed? I cannot
and do not sit by idly. I tell the community, in the most effective
way I can, that there is no case against my client. Unless I do this,
how can I say that I am a guardian of my client's interests?
8. Knapp v. Leonardo, 46 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2566 (1995).
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II. VINDICATING THE CLIENT'S RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH
The First Amendment does not cease to apply to those ac-
cused of crimes. There is, of course, no law prohibiting them from
speaking, although jail regulations can sometimes make it a little
difficult logistically. It is, however, a terrible blunder for criminal
defendants to exercise their speech rights themselves with respect
to the accusations against them. The prosecution is not shy about
using a defendant's statements to the press against the defendant
in court. Even the most innocent of defendants may, through in-
artful word choice, give the prosecution ammunition.
Through me, my clients can exercise First Amendment rights
that would otherwise effectively disappear for the duration of
trial-a time in which my clients may feel that their speech rights
are more important than at any other time in their lives.
IV. EXERCISING THE ATrORNEY'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
My final argument in favor of defense attorney activism in the
media arena is different from my earlier arguments. Only my cli-
ent's interests justify my speaking to the media. I do not do so for
the purpose of vindicating my own First Amendment rights. But I
do think that my own First Amendment rights are relevant. They
are relevant when it is alleged that some other values, embodied in
local rules or court orders, trump my right to speak on my client's
behalf. First Amendment values are among the most important
values in our constitutional framework. When the "ordered liber-
ties" march in order, the First Amendment liberties are surely in
the very front rank.
The interest in a fair criminal trial is also an interest of great
importance. It is, however, a factual question whether muzzling
defense counsel in the public square gives rise to a fairer trial. My
view is that when defense counsel talks to the press, it almost al-
ways redresses an imbalance in the public perception, which is cre-
ated, directly or indirectly, by the prosecution. A fairer trial re-
sults. But if there is a factual question about due process, trial
fairness, or attorney speech, the First Amendment rights of both
the client and the attorney weigh in favor of speech. As my clients
do not lose their First Amendment rights when charged, neither do
I waive my First Amendment rights when I elect to defend those
accused of crimes.
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